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ABSTRACT
Blacks have joined the enlisted ranks of the American
military in record numbers since the end of the draft.
However, the armed forces are now engaged in the process of
downsizing, and there is some speculation that blacks may be
disproportionately affected by the reduction-in-force. This
study analyzes defense drawdown policies, force demographics,
historical trends, and environmental factors in an atttempt to
determine the overall impact of the proposed cuts in military
manpower on persons in different racial/ethnic groups. The
results show that black representation in the military has
declined somewhat since 1990; and that it may continue to fall
as the force reduction processes over the next several years
and possibly beyond. It is recommended that further study be
undertaken of the differential effects of the force downsizing
on persons in the various racial/ethnic groups; and that the
search continue for effective alternatives to the current
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Current policies associated with the military force
reduction will affect the recruitment and retention of black
enlisted members affiliated with all branches of the armed
services. This reduction-in-force may affect the black
segment to a greater extent than the general military popula-
tion.
B. PURPOSE
This study provides manpower analysts with timely informa-
tion that should aid in the decision-making process on force
reductions. It attempts to measure the likely impact that
proposed recruiting and retention policies associated with the
force reduction may have on black enlisted members. Detailed
observations on the black segment of the enlisted force are
provided. These should prove beneficial to analysts in their
evaluation of various downsizing scenarios.
C. BACKGROUND
Historically, the main body of the U.S. military has
consisted of a relatively small career force made up of
volunteers. In times of major wars or national emergency,
this career force has been augmented by conscipts from the
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general population (Ref. 1]. Once the national emergency
has subsided, the force is reduced and the policy of
conscription is rescinded. A related concern in the manning
of the force--namely, which members of the society will be
considered qualified to serve in times of peace or war--has
never been definitively resolved.
Blacks have played an important role in the military
throughout the nation's history, having served from the
earliest days of the Revolutionary War to the more recent
battles of Operation Desert Storm. As one analyst has noted,
the black experience within the military has historically been
shaped by policies of exclusion during peacetime, and that of
wide acceptance during times of war [Ref. 2). These
policies led to the creation of a system in which blacks
served in the military at a level that was below their
proportion within the national population during times of
peace and at or near a proportionate level during times of
war. Progress toward equal opportunity for blacks in the
military has been an uneven process, sometimes hampered or
heightened by constants in society such as prejudice, ideal-
ism, and manpower shortages.
During the Civil War, the need for manpower led to the
induction of 186,000 blacks for service in the Union Army.
About 30,000 blacks served in the Navy,, which constituted
2
about 25 percent of that service's total Civil War strength.
Following the Civil War, idealism fostered the creation of
four all-black calvary units. During most of the nineteenth
century, blacks served in an integrated Navy, comprising up to
30 percent of total enlisted strength. During the 1900s,
policies paralleling Jim Crow legislation of legalized
segregation led to restrictions on the service of blacks in
the military. During World War I, blacks constituted only 1.2
percent of total Navy enlisted strength. Although there were
separate drafts for whites and blacks during World War I,
mobilization ensured that blacks serving in the Army would
approximate their proportion within the general population
(about 10.7 percent). Approximately 368,000 black men were
drafted during the First World War, which constituted about
13.1 percent of all draftees. Due to retrenchment and the
curtailment of enlistments following World War I, at the
outbreak of World War II, blacks made up only about 1.2
percent of enlisted strength in both the Army and the Navy.
[Ref. 3]
Concerned with equal-rights, black civil-rights leaders
sought to use World War II to expand opportunities for members
of their communities. In response to these pressures,
legislation was passed stating that no discrimination would be
allowed against any person on account of race or color in the
selection and training of men for military service.
[Ref. 4]
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World War II would call to arms all available manpower.
The Roosevelt administration decreed that the proportion of
blacks in the Army was to be commensurate to that group's
proportion in the national population. With national threats
looming on the horizon, the Burke-Wadsworth Act was passed in
1940 establishing the first peacetime conscription in the
nation's history [Ref. 5]. From 1940 to the end of 1945,
the military grew from a force of 458,000 to a size of
12,123,000 [Ref. 6]. Although black military strength
never reached "proportionality" during the Second World War,
over 900,000 blacks served in the Army, 167,000 in the Navy,
and about 17,000 in the Marine Corps [Ref. 7].
At the close of World War II, the national economy was in
a state of growth. The better-educated and qualified con-
scripts of both races were ready to return home to available
jobs and the prospect of a new life helped by G.I. Bill
benefits. During 1945 and 1946, the services discovered that,
as the armed forces were demobilized, the percentage of blacks
within the enlisted ranks was increasing. The Army estimated
that black representation would reach 15 percent or more by
1947, exceeding that group's wartime high of 9.58 percent.
The Navy also expected rises in black enlistments during the
short term. The Gillem Board was organized to study the
concerns on how to best employ blacks within the Army. The
major recommendation coming from this study was that, in the
event of another war, manpower should be provided to the
4
military from the general population without regard to race.
Issues of integration were not reviewed.
Due to the emerging Cold War, America's new
responsibilities as a world power, and concerns for military
efficiency, racial integration would soon become a reality in
the U.S. military. With Executive Order 9981, signed in July
1948, President Truman rescinded the policy of segregation
within the military. Removal of this artificial barrier would
eventually lead to increased opportunities for blacks in the
military services.
Concerned that the nation should not be caught off-guard
again, the military did not return to the small, pre-World War
II force levels. During the late 1940s to the early 1970s,
the military stabilized at around 1.5 millicn troops and
increased tc levels around 3.5 million during the conflicts in
Korea and Vietnam. The policy of peacetime consctiption was
continued to maintain this large force, except for an 18-month
break from March 1947 to July 1948 [Ref. 81.
The number of young men eligible for military service
doubled during the period 1955 to 1975 [Ref. 9].
Relatively stable military manpower requirements determined
that only a small portion of each year's 18-through 21-year-
old-cohort be called to arms through selective service.
During the 1950s, 80 percent of each year's cohort faced
the prospect of military duty through selective service. By
the early 1960s, this number had decreased to 60 percent; and
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by the late 1960s, it had dropped to 30 percent
[Ref. 10]. Pay for the first-term inductee was below
the civilian wage. This, coupled with the inherent risks of
military service, led to concerys that the men drafted were
doing so at an economic and social disadvantage in relation to
their counterparts who avoided the draft.
The issue concerning equity of military service had come
to public attention at various times, leading to presidential
campaign promises by Adlai Stevenson (a Democrat) and Barry
Goldwater (a Republican) in 1956 and 1964, respectively, to
end the military draft. During 1966, prompted by the
unpopular war in Vietnam, "equity" became an issue of
widespread discussion. In his 1968 presidential bid, Richard
Nixon promised to look at returning the military to a
volunteer force, if elected. In March 1969, President Nixon
created an advisory commission to study the feasibility of
eliminating military conscription and plan for an all-
volunteer military [Ref. 11]. The President's
Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (or "Gates Commission")
determined that economic incentives could be used to
adequately attract volunteers of sufficient quantity and
quality. [Ref. 12] After much debate--which centered
around the issues of force composition, cost, military
capability, and patriotism--Congress voted to institute the
policy of an "All-Volunteer Force" (or AVF) beginning in June
1973.
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In contrast to conclusions drawn by the Gates Commission,
blacks elected to participate in the enlisted ranks of the
armed forces at levels that exceeded their proportion in the
national population. Various reasons have been offered to
explain these participation rates. The most popular and
widely accepted reasons include: the military is viewed as an
equal opportunity employer by black Americans; the military
provides blacks with socioeconomic opportunities and job
training that cannot be obtained as readily in the civilian
sector; and military employment is viewed as a source of
status within the black community. (Ref. 13]
The Cold War came to an end in November 1989. As a
result, it has been determined that the United States no
longer requires a large military to meet its national objec-
tives. A reduction of military forces is required; however,
this time, it will not be as simple as it was following
previous conflicts. The present military is a force comprised
exclusively of volunteers. The economy is not enjoying rapid
rates of growth, and discharged veterans face the prospect of
returning home to conditions of unemployment. These individ-
uals came into the military for various reasons, believing
that, if they did a good job, the military would be a source
of long-term employment. Unlike conscripts, the majority of
these individuals do not look forward to release from military
service.
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In an effort to reduce the defense budget by $122 billion
over five years, the current Department of Defense policy is
to trim the military force to a level of about 1.6 million
individuals or less by the end of fiscal 1997. Some individu-
als believe that current budget cuts may even require the
military to reduce its forces beyond this level. This would
be especially true if the economic assumptions and evaluations
of defense needs used to estimate current costs prove wrong. [Ref. 14]
Because blacks made up a significant portion of the
military during the build-up of the All-Volunteer Force--
representing as much as 23 percent of all active-duty enlisted
personnel at the start of the 1990s--it can be predicted that
they may likewise represent a large porportion of the force
reductions.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methods employed in this study include the
gathering of information from the most current and relevant
literature, analysis of enlistment and retention trends
established during the All-Volunteer Force, and telephone
interviews. Through the analysis of demographic data, changes
in black representation within the military have been




This study uses a range of historical and current litera-
ture in discussing black issues over the course of the all-
volunteer period. In addition, data from the Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC) are used to establish trends associated
with military applicants, recruits, and career enlisted
personnel, including their demographics and aptitude test
scores.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The organization of this thesis is designed to present a
comprehensive understanding of blacks in the military and
concerns associated with that group in relation to the force
reduction. Chapter II presents a variety of background
information, ranging from a historical perspective on blacks
in the All-Volunteer Force to a discussion of the "pros and
cons" associated with current downsizing policies. Chapter
III analyzes historical data and trends established over the
all-volunteer period. Future characteristics of the military
force are projected based on these trends and expectations
concerning population changes, demographics, education level,
and aptitude test scores. Chapter IV discusses black partici-
pation rates and provides an in-depth discussion of the data,
research methodology, and findings. Chapter V discusses the
conclusions drawn from the findings and offers recommendations
based on the study.
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. INTRODUCTION
For decades, the United States defense plan focused on
world communism and the Soviet Union. As explained by Tyler,
military planning required that a force of sufficient size be
maintained that could simultaneously fight a ground war in
Europe and a smaller war elsewhere, most likely in the Middle
East or Asia. That plan led to the growth of a large defense
establishment and the spending of hundreds of billions of
dollars on new weapons. (Ref. 15]
Personnel are generally considered the "military's
greatest asset." When other elements of the defense
machinery, such as weaponry, technology, training, or spare
parts are found lacking, service members are expected to fill
the void and somehow compensate [Ref. 16]. In order to
meet the challenges of the future, the military services are
expected to recruit and retain sufficient people with the
proper skills.
Over the first two decades of the all-volunteer military,
black participation within the enlisted force increased, at
times raising concern that this group may be far too
overrepresented in relation to its presence in the general
population. To adequately understand and discuss the effects
of the post-Cold War drawdown on the black segment of the
10
population, it is helpful to first review the history of black
participation within the AVF.
Extensive literature has been written on the AVF. Major
topics of interest have been cost, recruitment (and associated
quality and quantity issues), force composition and racial
balance, the service of women and other groups affected by
exclusionary policies, equity, black overrepresentation, and
the social benefits and burdens of military service. Several
of the above issues are reviewed here, since they serve to
identify public concerns and outline black contributions
during the all-volunteer era.
The AVF has experienced varying degrees of success since
1973. In evaluating the performance of the volunteer mili-
tary, the key determinants have generally been the attainment
of manpower goals and the quality of new recruits, based on
their education and enlistment test scores.
The AVF period can be divided into five phases. Economic
and political considerations that have affected recruitment
and the associated issues of manpower quality and quantity
serve as period boundaries. The phases that clearly delineate
the AVF are: 1973 to 1976; 1977 to 1980; 1981 to 1989; 1989
to 1992; and a new phase starting in 1993. Each of these
phases is discussed below with respect to the black segment of
the enlisted force.
11
B. FORMULATION OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
President Richard Nixon appointed the Gates Commission in
March 1969 with the mandate to study the costs and
practicality of an AVF. Eight months later, the Commission
reported its findings, concluding that an AVF was feasible.
In previous years, Congressional debates had been held on
the subject of returning the military from a selective service
system to an all-volunteer force. On each occasion, the idea
was scrapped due to large cost estimates. According to the
Gates Commission, to maintain a force of 2.5 million
personnel, $2.54 billion (in 1971 dollars) in additional pay
would be required each year [Ref. 17]. This was an
acceptable cost figure to Congress in relation to previous
cost estimates of $6 to $8 billion annually.
On the hotly-debated issue of race and force composition,
the Commission arrived at the following conclusions:
An army of the poor and blacks would not result. Black
enlistments in an AVF would be only one percentage point
higher than in a draft. [Ref. 18]
The Commission estimated that, in the short-run, black
representation would reach 15 percent of the total, with a
projected decline to 14.1 percent during the 1980s. Indeed,
by the first half of 1974, black representation in the
enlisted force had reached a level of 14.9 percent
[Ref. 19].
Some observers maintained that the Gates Commission
findings on cost and composition were unsubstantiated. As of
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1974, with a force level of 2.1 million individuals, the
increase in salary expenditures far exceeded the original cost
estimates ever, without adjustments for the declining manpower
quality (Ref. 20].
Cost and racial composition estimates provided by the
Gates Commission have been criticized by numerous scholars who
have conducted studies on the AVF [Ref. 21]. In fact,
the Commission's projections have not withstood the scrutiny
of careful review nor the test of time. As concluded by
Moskos and Janowitz in 1974:
It ought to have been apparent that there was no effective
basis for making definitive manpower estimates on the
quantity and composition of the all-volunteer force. At
best one can report current trends and offer informed
speculations as to the future. [Ref. 22]
1. Phase I (1973 TO 1976): Early Recruiting Successes
In November 1971, Congress passed a bill that paved
the way for the eventual end of the draft. The career force
received an 11.6 percent pay raise along with a substantial
increase in basic allowance for quarters. First-term enlisted
pay was also raised substantially, doubling from $134.40 to
$268.50 per-month. Authorizations were established for
enlistment bonuses and other AVF-related special pays. This
pay raise proved to be large enough to attract sufficient
volunteers. (Ref. 23]
The authority to draft men was scheduled to end in
June 1973. As the Gates Commission had envisioned, the number
of military volunteers increased, even though the United
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States was still engaged in the Vietnam war. The last draft
call was issued in December 1972. Due to the large number of
persons volunteering for military service, the AVF was thus
implemented six months early, commencing January 1973.
During Phase I, the military was able to attract
sufficient numbers of volunteers of the quality demanded. As
one analyst points out, this was primarily due to a weak
economy, high youth unemployment, a large pool of available
manpower (with the tail end of the baby-boom generation), and,
for a brief period, military wages comparable to those of
civilian counterparts. [Ref. 24]
2. Factors Leading To AVF Racial Composition Changes
Black participation in the military has been on the
rise since the armed forces were ordered to integrate their
ranks by President Truman in 1948. In 1955, blacks comprised
8 percent of the force. In 1962, this figure had increased to
8.3 percent; and by 1970, blacks accounted for 9.8 percent of
the force, with the highest concentrations in the Army.
During the 1960s, blacks were found to reenlist at nearly
twice the rate of whites. (Ref. 25]
At the end of 1974, black composition within the
enlisted ranks reached a level of 15.7 percent. Five years
later, black enlisted participation increased to 21.2 percent
for all services combined, and stood at over 32 percent in the
enlisted ranks of the Army. [Ref. 26]
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Early literature on the topic of force composition
tended to draw the connection between the end of the draft and
rising levels of black participation in the military, failing
to explore the many other possible reasons behind this
phenomenon. In a 1977 study, Cooper attempted to pinpoint the
factors that led blacks to enlist at a greater rate than their
white counterparts within the youth population.
[Ref. 27) Cooper concluded that increased education
levels of blacks, higher unemployment rates, and a lack of
comparable wages in the civilian sector were the dominant
factors that accounted for increased enlistments by blacks
after the start of the AVF.
From 1955 to 1970, the proportion of blacks receiving
a high school diploma increased threefold. These rising
education levels, and related improvements on the military's
enlistment test, served to increase the number of blacks found
eligible for military service.
Black teenagers during this period experienced
exceedingly high levels of unemployment compared with their
white counterparts. Between the period 1965 to 1973, the rate
of unemployment for white youths aged 18 to 19 averaged 10.7
percent [Ref. 28). During a comparable timeframe (1960
to 1970), unemployment levels among black youths in the same
age group averaged 22 percent. Unemployment levels for black
teenagers increased to 30 percent or more beginning with
fiscal 1971 [Ref. 29]. These high levels of unemploy-
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ment in the civilian labor market consequently "pushed" many
black youths toward enlistment in the military.
The earnings potential for blacks in the civilian
labor force also lagged behind that for whites. Although
modest gains had been made in this area over the 1960s, during
the early 1970s median income levels for blacks were again on
the decline. In 1971 and 1972, a fulltime, year-round,
employed black man between the ages of 18 to 24 could expect
to earn 85 percent of the wage of his non-black counterpart.
By 1974, this figure had decreased to just 72 percent.
(Ref. 30]
C. THE DECLINE OF THE AVF
Confident that the early successes of the volunteer
military would continue, lawmakers focused their attention on
other issues. Because they did not fully understand the
economic and social considerations upon which the AVF was
based, all-volunteer recruiting came perilously close to
failure.
1. Phase I1: 1976 to 1980
The early successes of the AVF led many lawmakers and
government officials to believe that the military would
continue to attract sufficient recruits. Believing that
military pay was adequate, if not excessive, Congress did
little to maintain a rate of pay comparable to that of the
civilian wage. Legislation was passed authorizing defense
16
cuts and pay freezes, yet the civilian minimum wage was
increased, serving to widen the military-civilian disparity in
pay [Ref. 31).
The G.I. Bill, a longstanding program that provided
scholarship assistance to service members and veterans, was
discontinued due to concerns of its high cost and ineffi-
ciency. A main argument was that a large quantity of recruits
did not view the G.I. Bill as a tangible benefit upon entry;
and they only took advantage of the program after leaving the
military, thus making it a costly recruiting program.
Furthermore, the G.I. Bill was orginally intended to provide
readjustment assistance and compensation to persons who served
in the military during periods when the draft was used, not
under an all-volunteer environment when pay and other benefits
were relatively high. The group of recruits who aspired to
achieve higher education through military service were now
offered a newly-created program called "VEAP" (or the Post-
Vietnam Era Veterans' Educational Assistance Program) as a
replacement for the G.I. Bill. [Ref. 32]
VEAP was offered to individuals joining the military
after 1 January 1977. It required service members to make
voluntary monthly contributions, which the government would
match in prescribed limits. The maximum level of government-
provided assistance, however, was far below the amount of
money once available through the G.I. Bill. Furthermore, it
could be argued that the pay disparity, coupled with the
17
monthly VEAP contribution, served to lower the wages available
to the quality recruit interested in acquiring a college
education.
In the general economy, the recession bottomed cout and
a trend toward growth was starting. Youth unemployment rates
were falling. The unemployment rate for white youths remained
substantially lower than that of black youths, thus providing
white youths with relatively greater encouragement to pursue
civilian employment opportunities.
In addition to the above, the following concerns have
been cited as possible contributors to the low recruitment
rates of the late 1970s:
a. Excessive media coverage on the problems of the AVF;
b. Low public opinion of military service, compounded by
continued anti-Vietnam sentiments;
c. Trends by youth away from blue collar jobs and military
enlisted service toward college and white collar jobs;
d. Large-scale federal social programs offering jobs to
many youths who would otherwise have enlisted in the
military; and
e. Growing federally-sponsored scholarship programs that
made it possible for low-and moderate-income youth to
attend college without a military service commitment (a
"G.I. Bill without the G.I."). [Ref. 33]
Between 1977 and 1980, it was apparent that the required
number of recruits could be achieved only by lowering quality
standards. Realizing that recruitment would be difficult over
this period, some branches of service decided to forgo
18
manpower quantity and use their limited resources to attract
quality recruits (Ref. 34].
2. Quality Standards Affected by the AFQT Misnorming
Besides economic considerations, a major factor that
led to an increase in the number of blacks within the military
during Phase II of the AVF was the AFQT (Armed Forces Qualifi-
cation Test) "misnorming,' which occurred from January 1976 to
September 1980.
The AFQT is an aptitude composite derived from a
combination of verbal and math subtests on the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). It serves as a measure
of "trainability" during the enlistment screening process, and
is also used to compare the distribution of recruits across
the services by aptitude. [Ref. 35]
During 1976, a new ASVAB form was developed for
service-wide use in enlistment screening. The AFQT subset of
the newly created ASVAB was to be normed to World War II stan-
dards, based on the assumption that the distribution of mental
aptitudes within the youth population had remained fairly
stable over the years. In February 1980, errors were discov-
ered in the methods used to norm the test. Corrective
measures were taken once the error was revealed, and a new
ASVAB was introduced in October 1980.
As Eitelberg notes, the net result was that, for four
years and nine months, enlistment standards were essentially
reduced and the services accepted many recruits who would
19
otherwise have been deemed unqualified [Ref. 36]. The
high-quality recruiting years that the services had initially
reported turned out to be years in which quality as well as
quantity were lacking. The Army was especially affected: its
initial recruiting report for fiscal 1979 showed that 9
percent of all new recruits scored in AFQT Category IV (the
lowest grouping of scores on the test, including the 10th
through 30th percentiles); in reality, as it was later found,
approximately 52 percent of the Army's recruits scored in
Category IV on the AFQT.
D. REBUILDING OF THE AVF
By 1981, lawmakers faced a choice of returning to the
draft or supporting the AVF with the proper resources.
1. Phase III: 1981 to 1989
Under the Reagan administration, basic pay, allow-
ances, and special pay were raised during fiscal 1981 and
1982, which served to bring military pay up to a level
considered comparable with civilian wages. VEAP supplements
were instituted by the Army and Navy, and a new G.I. Bill was
authorized.
Concerned with manpower quality, Congress placed a
limit of 25 percent on AFQT Category IV recruits in fiscal
1981. The Army was also directed to recruit a minimum of 65
percent high school graduates; and non-high school graduates
could be accepted only if they scored above the 30th
20
percentile on the AFQT. Additional "quality floors" were
placed on the services by Congress for fiscal 1982 and 1983.
In 1982, no service was allowed to have more than 25 percent
of its recruits scoring in AFQT Category IV; and in 1983, this
restriction was tightened to no more than 20 percent.
[Ref. 37)
Even though the economy took a downturn after 1983,
and pay comparability declined, the desired quality and
quantity of recruits were generally obtained throughout the
1980s. In an attempt to discover why the 1980s were
successful recruiting years, Warner found that, besides the
economic forces of relative pay and civilian unemployment, an
important determinant of high-quality military enlistments was
the improved use of recruiting resources made available to the
services by Congress (Ref. 38]. The recruiting
practices and resources found to be most important included
the willingness of the services to modify recruiter strength
as market conditions dictated, the establishment of recruiting
goals, the offering of educational benefits to potential
quality recruits, and the expenditure of advertising dollars.
E. REDUCTIONS IN DEFENSE SPENDING
Late 1989 marks the breakup of the Soviet Union and
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact under the strains of unsound
economic policies. These rapidly changing events promised to
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influence the military environment in which the United States
had operated for over 40 years.
Billions of dollars had been spent over the years to
maintain a capable deterrent to military aggression posed by
the Soviet Union. Some lawmakers contended that, with the end
of the Cold War, resources that had been used for defense
should be redirected toward pent-up domestic needs. Phase IV
is marked by those events and how they changed U.S. military
defense strategy.
1. Phase IV: 1990 to 1992 (End of the Cold-War)
For 40 years the enemy had been clearly identified as
world communism led by the Soviet Union; but, now, the enemy
was a faceless threat. In his 1990 State of the Union
address, President Bush talked about the changing world. He
described the period as a time of great transition, great
hope, and yet great uncertainty. Taking a cautious approach,
he announced that elements of the military posture, namely
troops stationed in Europe, could now be reduced.
[Ref. 39]
Following his speech, there was a great deal of
discussion and debate concerning the nation's defense needs.
Topics centered around how quickly troop reductions could
occur, what were the best ways to reduce the defense estab-
lishment, and what types of savings could be realized. The
desire for a "peace dividend" set the tone for this period.
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Generally, Congress wanted greater cuts in military
expenditures and force reductions than deemed appropriate by
the Executive Branch or the Pentagon leadership. In its
fiscal 1991 budget authorization, Congress demanded much
deeper cuts in defense expenditures and manpower than the
President had requested. Force reduction procedures were
outlined for the services, in an effort to minimize the impact
on mid-career personnel who would be forced out prior to
having served 20 years.
a. Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield
The start of Operation Desert Shield in August
1990 brought a temporary halt to the force drawdown. For the
first time since the Vietnam War, America sent a large
contingent of troops, numbering over 570,000, to a foreign
land. Facing the prospect of war, with a new and basically
untested military, the nation watched as events unfurled in
the Persian Gulf.
Based on the enemy's force, battle scenarios, and
probable duration of battle, America's casualty estimates
ranged from a few hundred to over 40,000. Support for the
President and his handling of the Iraqi conflict remained high
among the general public, but tended to wane as possible
casualty estimates rose. [Ref. 40]
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm revived
an old debate that has periodically focused attention on the
AVF, namely, the overrepresentation of blacks in the enlisted
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force. Issues concerning the service of blacks centered
primarily on fairness and the systemic causes of black
overrepresentation.
In a 1989 Pentagon report to Congress analyzing
the composition of the military, it was found that blacks
accounted for 14 percent of the nation's 18-to 24-year-old
population, yet they accounted for 22 percent of all enlisted
personnel. Blacks made up 26.7 percent and 19.9 percent,
respectively, of the Army and Marine Corps infantry units.
(Infantry units are most likely to see action during ground
engagements.) [Ref. 41]
b. Benefits and Burdens of Military Service
As noted by Eitelberg, America's armed forces
provide their members with many benefits in peacetime and
substantially increased burdens in times of national emergency
[Ref. 42]. This understanding was reinforced in 1991,
as the expectations of war in the Persian Gulf heightened.
For black youths, the benefits in peacetime centered on
opportunities for employment and education, training, travel,
and the prospect of improving one's socioeconomic standing.
Desert Storm underscored the fact that, due to
their overrepresentation in the armed services, black
Americans, as a group, faced a relatively greater chance than
did whites of being killed or wounded. Leaders within the
black community and government were torn over this issue.
Months earlier, they had expressed concern that the drawdown
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might disproportionately affect black youths. Once
hostilities were likely, the position of many black spokesmen
centered on "fairness," in the sense that the burdens of
defense should be distributed equitably across all segments of
the national population. [Ref. 43]
Supporters of the AVF emphasized that this was a
wholly volunteer military, comprised largely of high aptitude
individuals, who were aware of the inherent risks associated
with their service. From this viewpoint, the AVF concept is
one based on the principles of equal opportunity. It was also
said that, along with patriotic reasons, black youths are
attracted to the military because it is perceived as being
"color blind," where people are judged on the merits of their
work and not on the color of their skin. Institutions in the
larger society, on the other hand, have been unable to provide
blacks with similar opportunities.
Desert Storm turned out to be an unusually short
war. There were 266 American service members killed in the
war, and blacks represented 15 percent of the total. Dorn
attributed the low percentage of black casualties to the short
duration of the war, the fact that protracted ground battles
did not occur, and the relatively small number of casualties
overall [Ref. 44]. A highly-qualified and trained
military force, coupled with high-technology weapons, was seen
to have helped bring the war to a speedy end. Further,
Representative Les Aspin released a House Armed Services
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Committee report showing that, even though blacks were
overrepresented in the U.S. military, they did not face a
disproportionate risk of death in combat (Ref. 45].
Operation Desert Storm forced the nation, once
again, to question basic principles associated with all-
volunteer service in the military. Issues that arose from the
gulf war included the fairness of force composition,
ethnic/racial representation, the role of women in the
military, the proper level of quality to staff a high-
technology military, and the military's role in the training
and social advancement of America's youth.
With Desert Storm in the background, attention
returned to the force drawdown. Throughout the remainder of
this phase, the Bush administration expressed concern that the
drawdown be carried out slowly, because of increasing
uncertainties in the world environment. In the 1992
presidential campaign, Bill Clinton ran on a platform that
promised to reduce the military at a faster pace than that
proposed by President Bush. Clinton won the election, and his
presidency marks the start of Phase V.
2. Phase V (January 1993 and Beyond--What the Future
Holds)
The nation's revised defense plan calls for a force
that is overwhelmingly superior to those of regional powers,
such as that of Iraq during Operation Desert Storm. It must
also have the capability to be involved in one other regional
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contingency of a lesser nature, and be able to maintain a
presence in other critical overseas areas. [Ref. 46]
Using the fiscal 1987 force level of 2,174,000 active-
duty military personnel as a base, the Bush drawdown called
for a 25 percent reduction-in-force by fiscal 1997
[Ref. 47]. When Congressional budget negotiators
requested an illustrative fiscal 1991 defense budget that
reflected a speedier 25-percent drawdown, the Bush
administration proposed a fiscal 1995 active-duty force of
about 1.6 million individuals. [Ref. 48] As expected,
the Clinton administration requested larger defense-wide cuts
than those established under President Bush. Along with the
defense cuts, there has been a call for accelerated manpower
reductions. The current Department of Defense plan is to
reduce the military's active force to a level of 1.4 million
members by the end of fiscal 1997 [Ref. 49].
The key question, then, is how will the force drawdown
affect the number of blacks in the armed forces? This issue
is explored in the next chapter.
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III. THE POST-COLD WAR DRAWDOWN
A. INTRODUCTION
Both the Pentagon and Congress desire that the force
reduction be guided by readiness requirements with a
sensitivity toward personnel issues. The fair treatment and
trust of service members has been shown to be of major
importance. Transition programs, such as counselling,
employment assistance, verification of military experience,
and job fairs are available to all separating service members.
People who are forced to leave the military may receive
separation pay and a final opportunity to sign up for the
Montgomery G.I. Bill. Health benefits are provided to former
members and their families for periods of 60 to 120 days after
separation based on years of service. Family housing may be
provided for up to 180 days after separation based on a
"reasonable rent fee"; and commissary/exchange and base
privileges are authorized for up to two years after discharge.
[Ref. 50)
Within DoD, individuals having acquired between six and 19
years of active service are classified as "mid-career"
personnel. As of March 1992, mid-career personnel accounted
for nearly 45 percent of the force [Ref. 51]. Because
mid-careerists face the prospect of being released prior to
their eligibility for retirement, a common objective of those
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parties planning and implementing the drawdown is that it be
carried out with the least hardship toward this group of
individuals.
In formulating the fiscal 1991 Defense Authorization Bill,
Congress instructed the Department of Defense to reduce
military end-strength primarily through the control of
accessions and the management of expected turnover. The
drawdown procedures were stated as 'ollows:
a. Restrict accessions only to those numbers needed to
sustain the smaller force envisioned for fiscal year 1995.
b. Dismiss as many as possible of those members having
acquired 20 years of service yet remaining on active duty.
Congress changed provisions in the personnel system to
encourage these members to voluntarily separate, and made
it easier for the services to dismiss them involuntarily.
As an example, provisions were authorized to reduce
mandatory in-grade time for officers and enlisted members.
c. Hold down reenlistments to a level which would be
necessary to sustain the force envisioned for fiscal year
1995.
Only after these measures were exhausted, would Congress
allow the services to use involuntary separation procedures.
The military services have used involuntary separations
chiefly as a means to more precisely align and shape the force
structure [Ref. 52]. To date, involuntary separations
have been kept to a minimum and used principally to force the
departure of retirement-eligible individuals.
To accomplish the drawdown, the services have relied
mainly on their ability to restrict accessions, control
reenlistments, and encourage the voluntary separation of mid-
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careerists through the use of the Voluntary Separation
Incentive (VSI) and Special Separation Benefit (SSB). The VSI
and SSB offer monetary incentives to personnel who elect to
leave the military before qualifying for retirement. The
programs were authorized by Congress in fiscal 1992 as a way
of "keeping faith" and honoring the service of mid-career
personnel.
B. EFFECTS OF THE DRAWDOWN ON BLACK ENLISTED MEMBERS
Since 1991, officials within DoD have claimed that (1) the
force drawdown will not have a differential impact on
minorities or women; (2) members of these groups will probably
separate in numbers roughly proportional to their
representation among all members of the total force; and (3)
when the drawdown is completed, the demographic composition of
the force will probably be the same as it was before the
drawdown. [Ref. 53) In a report released in early 1993
by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force
Management and Personnel), it was once again stated that the
drawdown was not expected to have a disproportionate effect on
minority or female members. However, this time it was also
said that demographic trends cannot be precisely projected
until after 1997 (when the drawdown is complete), since the
services are using a variety of measures to balance and shape
the force [Ref. 54]. This chapter of the thesis
examines the prospects for participation by blacks in the
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military, considering present strategies to reduce the active-
duty force.
1. Occupational Mix
The Department of Defense divides enlisted occupations
into 10 general areas. These 10 areas can also be distributed
according to three skill levels, based on the type of
occupation and eligibility requirements used to place service
members in occupational training [Ref. 55]. Thus, "low-
skill" occupations, by definition, usually involve less
complicated tasks and have the lowest aptitude or test score
standards for entry. The occupational areas, with their
corresponding skill levels, and proportion of enlisted
personnel assigned to each during fiscal 1991 are displayed in
Table 1. As of fiscal 1991, nearly one-third (31 percent) of
the active enlisted force was assigned to a low-skill
occupation. Forty-one percent were assigned to an occupation
requiring mid-level skills, and 22 percent to a highly-
skilled, high-technology occupation.
During fiscal 1991, blacks accounted for 22.9 percent
of the enlisted force. Table 2 shows the racial composition
of each enlisted occupational area as of fiscal 1991. Based
on these percentages, the majority of blacks were concentrated
in mid-skill or low-skill occupations. The occupations
reflecting the highest levels of overrepresentation for blacks
were Administration, Service and Supply, and Medical/Dental.
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TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY
ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND
SKILL LEVEL, FISCAL 1991
OCCUPATIONAL AREA SKILL PERCENT
LEVEL
(0) Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Specialists L 17.7
(1) Electronic Equipment Repairers H 10.0
(2) Commanications and Intelligence Specialists H 9.9
(3) Medical and Dental Specialists M 5.8
(4) Other Allied Specialists H 2.3
(5) Functional Support and Administration M 15.5
(6) Electrical/Hechanical Equipment Repairers M 20.0
(7) Craftsmen L 4.0
(8) Service mid Supply Handlers L 8.8
(9) *ton-occupational 6.0
Total 100.0
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the HMlitary
Services. Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p. 59.
* Won-occupational includes patients, students, those with unassigned duties, and
unknowns. Skill level: H = high, M mid-level, L = low. Note: Skill level has
been categorized by major occupational groups. As pointed out by litelberg [PIf. 55),
skill levels may represent the average for the occupational group; however, each
occupational group could include occupations requiring skills that are either above or
below the group average.
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TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED
PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND RACIAL/ETHNIC
GROUP, FISCAL 1991
Occupational Area White Black Other Total
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Sea-
l manship Specialists 69.3 23.6 7.1 100.0
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers 62.9 13.2 3.9 100.0
2 Communications and Intelligence
Specialists 71.6 23.a 4.6 100.0
3 Medical and Dental Specialists 64.7 26.6 8.7 100.0
4 Other Allied Specialists 74.9 19.8 5.3 100.0
5 Functional Support and Adminis-
tration 57,2 34.8 8.0 100.0
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment
Repairers 76.2 17.4 6.4 100 0
7 Craf tsmen 78.1 16.3 5.7 100.0
8 Service and Supply Kandlers 62.3 30.5 7.2 100.0
9 Mon-occupational 77.7 17.2 5.1 j 1U.0
All Occupations 67.4 22.9 9.8 [100.0
Rowe may not add to total due to rounding.
* Mon-occupational Incluees patients, students,* those with unassigned duties,
and unknowns. 
;LSource: Adapted from Department of Defense, Pouato Ro1±I4XXon n
Services. Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDens
(Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p 63.
Due to the reduction of forces and the changing
military mission, it .Ls likely that the military's
occupational mix will be ..odified. Since blacks are
disproportionately cepresented in certain occupations, there
is a possibility that they miay be disproportionately affected
as well by any change in the distribution of military
occupations or skills. As shown in Table 3, during fiscal
1973, 48 percent of black enlistees were assigned to a low-
skill occupation. By 1991, black representation in these
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occupations had decreased to 32.6 percent. Over this 18-year
period, black representation in high-technology occupations
nearly doubled from 9 to 17.9 percent. At the same time, the
proportion of blacks working in mid-level occupations
increased slightly from 43 percent in 1973 to 45 percent in
1991.
2. Quality Standards
During peacetime, a tool available to DoD for the
purpose of force reduction is the control of personnel quality
standards. An increase in quality standards can serve to
restrict accessions and limit reenlistment opportunities for
the marginally qualified.
A "high quality" recruit is currently defined as a
person who possesses a high school diploma and scores in the
upper 50th percentile on the AFQT. It has been demonstrated,
and generally accepted, that high-quality recruits are more
likely, on average, to complete training and to be promoted at
a quicker pace than other recruits. Readiness and discipline
problems have also been found to diminish with the higher-
quality recruit. [Ref. 56]
Possession of a high school diploma has been found to
correlate with a person's "adaptability" to military service
(or completion of a first-term contract), while scores on the
AFOT are generally indicative of a person's "trainability" (or
likelihood of successfully completing training). Currently,
to gain entry into the military, a non-high school graduate
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Table 3. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED
PERSONNEL BY OCCUPATIONAL AREA AND RACIAL/ETHNIC
GROUP IN FISCAL 1991 COMPARED WITH PERCENTAGE
DISTRIBUTION OF BLACKS IN FISCAL 1973.
FY 1973 FY 1991
Occupational Area
Black Black White Other
0 Infantry, Gun Crews, and Seamanship Special-
ists 27.0 19.0 18.6 20.5
1 Electronic Equipment Repairers 4.0 6.0 12.3 6.4
2 Communications and Intelligence Specialists 4.0 10.7 10.8 7.6
3 Medical and Dental Specialists 5.0 7.0 5.8 8.3
4 Other Allied Specialists 1.0 2.1 3.0 2.0
5 Functional Support and Administration 23.0 24.4 13.4 20.4
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairers 15.0 15.8 23.1 20.9
7 Craftsmen 4.0 3.0 4.8 3.8
8 Service and Supply Handlers 17.0 12.1 8.4 10.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Colums may not add to total due to rounding
Note: non-occupational includes patients, students, those with unassigned duties, and
unknowns. Non-occupational data was unavailable for fiscal 1973. To provide
realistic comparisons, the non-occupational group was excluded from the fiscal 1991
distributions.
Source: Adapted from Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Milttary
Services. Fiscal Year 1991 (Washington. DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel), Oct. 1992, p 62.
(including those with an equivalency certificate) is required
to attain a higher score on the AFQT than that of a high
school graduate (though the services have admitted relatively
few non-graduates in recent years). This is done because
considerable differences have been found in the attrition
rates of military personnel based on their educational
attainment (i.e., whether they are a high school graduate,
non-high school graduate, or holder of a GED high school
equivalency certificate). [Ref. 57]
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AFQT scores are grouped into five major categories.
Table 4 shows these AFQT categories and their corresponding
percentile scores along with the expected level of
trainability. Category I individuals are of the highest
quality sought by the military services. Because members of
this group have a high propensity to attend college following
high school graduation and are highly sought by civilian
employers, the military services draw only a small segment of
these people [Ref. 58]. By law, the services are
restricted from accepting individuals with test scores below
the 10th percentile. This being the case, Category IV
personnel are of the lowest quality deemed acceptable by the
military. In addition to the limitations imposed by Congress,
whenever possible, the services attempt to restrict their
enlistment of "CAT IV" personnel. The bulk of recruiting
resources are targeted toward persons in categories I through
ILIA. The end result is that the majority of service manpower
requirements are derived from AFQT Catgories II and III
(including persons in Category IIIB).
In general, men usually score higher than women on the
ASVAB subtests associated with mechanical and electronic
skills. Women tend to out-perform men in the administrative
areas. On average, whites tend to score higher than non-black
minorities, who, in turn, tend to score higher than blacks.
[Ref. 59]
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TABLE 4. ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST (AFQT)
CATEGORIES BY PERCENTILE SCORES AND
ESTIMATED LEVEL OF TRAINABILITY
AFQT PER- LEVEL OF TRAINABILITY
CATEGORY CENTILE
I 93 - 99 Well Above Average
II 65 - 92 Above Average
III-A 50 - 64 Average to Above Average
III-B 31 - 49 Average to Below Average
IV-A 21 - 30 Below Average
IV-B 16 - 20 Below Average
IV-C 10 - 15 Below Average
V * 01 - 09 * Well Below Average *
Source: DoD Instruction 1336.5 of 15 Jul 1987, Autousted Extracts of Active Duty
Military Personnel Records. Eitelberg, N.J., Manpower for military Occupations,
Department of Defense, p. 74, 1988.
Note: * Not permitted to serve in the mllitary by lau.
The number of blacks with a high school diploma has
been increasing. As depicted in Figure 1, since 1975 a higher
percentage of black youths entering the military for the first
time (identified as "non-prior service" or NPS), tend to
possess a high school diploma as compared with their white
counterparts. However, a relatively large proportion of black
high school graduates also enter the military with a score in
AFQT Category IV.
Figure 2 shows the AFQT scores of new recruits by
fiscal year from 1973 through 1992. Since 1980, enlistments
of high quality recruits (depicted by Categories I - IIIA)
have increased substantially. Modest downturns have been
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experienced in Category IIIB. The sharpest declines are found
for AFQT Category IV personnel. In 1981, persons scoring in
Category IV accounted for approximately 21 percent of all new
recruits. By 1992, this figure had declined to less than 1
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Figure 1. Percent of New Recruits Who Possessed a High
School Diploma at Time of Entry by Race,
Fiscal 1973-92
accessions have shown positive growth since 1980, the
percentage of high-quality accessions who are black still
remains below that of whites (and all new recruits as a
38
whole). Since 1989, black-high quality recruitment has
increased by 16 percentage points. As depicted in Figure 4,
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persons in Category IV, who declined by 13.5 percentage points
over the same period. This suggests that a sizable number of
individuals who would have been qualified for military service







PERC•NT IN AFQT CATEGORIES I-IlIA
, ALL REC•IETS + WHITE * BLACI
Source: Military Ebtrance Processing Station ftanination and
Accession file, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA
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The force drawdown will reduce the number of personnel
of all races or ethnic backgrounds within the armed forces.
However, if the drawdown is accompanied by an increase in
quality standards, it is quite likely that blacks, who tend to
have the lowest scores on the AFQT, will be disproportionately
cut off from opportunities to serve in the military
[Ref. 60). Current trends in the areas of personnel




A 40 / '6 -'
35
* 25 \ .
72 74 76 78 89 82 84 86 88 90 92
Fiscal Year
AFIT CATEGORY
' CAT I - 111A + CAT 1118 * CAT I9
Source: Military Entrance Processing station Examination and
Accession File, maintained by Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA
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3. Personnel Turnover or Separation
Within a manpower system, turnover (or loss) of
personnel must be managed to create and maintain a stable
workforce. DoD uses the term "separation" to depict turnover.
There are two main types of separation, voluntary and
involuntary. Involuntary separation covers all losses for
reasons beyond the control of the individual, such as death,
ill-health, excessive supply of personnel, or failure to meet
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minimum behavioral or performance standards. Voluntary
separations from the enlisted force occur when the individual
leaves, usually to return to civilian life, to pursue training
opportunities, or to enter an officer commissioning program.
[Ref. 61]
Separation statistics for recent years within the AVF
are shown in Tables 5 and 6. As presented in Table 5, during
1986 there were 315,638 enlisted separations for reasons other
than dropping from the rolls, reenlistment, record correction,
and drops from the strength count due to reasons of desertion,
TABLE 5. NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-
DUTY ENLISTED PERSONNEL "LOSSES' BY RACIAL/
ETHNIC GROUP, FISCAL 1986, 1989, AND 1991
RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP 1986 1989 1991
White 77.6 77.1 75.4
Black 17.9 18.0 19.2
Other 4.5 4.9 5.2
Unknown 0.1 0.1 0.3
Total
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 315,638 1303,106 266,110
Notes: LoNsse represent all separations for reasons other than dropping from the
rolls, reenlistment, record correction and drops from strength count due to reasons of
desertion, imprisonment, or missing in action/prisoner of war. Percentages may not
add up to 100 due to rounding.
Source: Active Duty Loss Files maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center,
Monterey, CA.
imprisonment, or missing in action/ prisoner of war. In
fiscal 1991, 266,110 individuals separated from active duty.
Between the five-year period from 1986 to 1991, "other"
minorities separating from the military increased by 0.69
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percentage points. At the same time, separations for blacks
increased by 1.31 percentage points, and white separations
declined by 2.23 percentage points.
Table 6 shows that, from 1986 to 1991, the percentage
of white men separating has remained near 89 percent and that
of white women near the entire female separation average of 11
percent. The separation rate of black men has declined by
almost 4 percentage points over the period, from 87 percent in
TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE LOSSES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY
ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACE (WHITE
AND BLACK) AND GENDER, FISCAL
1986, 1989, AND 1991
MALE FEMALE
FISCAL
YEAR WHITE BLACK ALL WHITE BLACK ALL
1986 89.5 87.2 89.1 10.5 12.8 10.9
1989 89.5 85.0 88.7 10.5 15.0 11.3
1991 88.8 83.2 87.7 11.2 16.9 12.3
Notes: Losse represent all separations for reasons other than dropping
from the rolls, reenlistment, record correction and drops from strength
count due to reasons of desertion, imprisolment, or missing in action/-
prisoner of war. Percentages my not add up to 100 due to rounding.
Bource: Active Duty Loss File& maintained by the Defense Manpower Data
Center, Monterey, CA.
1986 to 83 percent in 1991. Separations by black women, on
the other hand, increased from less than 13 percent in 1986 to
almost 17 percent in 1991.
These figures show that separations from military
service by black women have been increasing since the mid-to-
late 1980s. Proportionately, the separation rates for black
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men are lower than those of all other groups. A major concern
here is the finding that black women, in particular, are
experiencing a higher rate of separation than that of the
total female population.
Historically, less than 10 percent of new recruits
during a given year will complete 20 years of service and thus
qualify for retirement benefits [Ref. 62]. During
fiscal 1991, approximately 1,300 retirement-eligible
individuals (including officers) were involuntarily separated.
Data for this study were derived from records of individuals
having enlisted during the all-volunteer force era.
Presumably, only a small number of individuals who enlisted in
1973 to 1976 will face the prospect of an involuntary
separation starting in 1994. Based on this premise, the major
emphasis of this study focuses on voluntary separations. Two
programs that have been used to shape the occupational mix
through voluntary means are the VSI and SSB.
4. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) and Special
Separation Benefit (SSB) Programs
The purpose of the VSI and SSB programs is to
influence mid-career personnel serving in overmanned or non-
critical skill areas to leave the military voluntarily.
Compensation for VSI is based on the member's monthly base pay
amount (excluding housing allowances, subsistence pay, and
special pays) multiplied by 12 (months). This composite is
multiplied by .025 times the member's years of service. The
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calculated amount is then payable each year for twice the
number of years the member served. Unlike VSI, SSB is a lump-
sum payment. It is calculated as 15 percent of the member's
monthly base pay, multiplied by 12 (months) and multiplied
again by the number of years on active duty. Over the long-
run, a larger sum of money can be attained through the VSI
program.
In 1992, the typical SSB participant was a white man
with 11 years of service, who entered the military with an
AFQT score in Category IIIB, and was working in a mid-skill
occupation. Although similar, the VSI participant was
distinguished from the SSB-taker by seniority (15 years of
service, on average) and a higher score on the AFQT (Category
II).
During 1992, 42,751 enlisted members elected to
participate in one of these programs. Of those voluntarily
separating, 39,154 (91.6 percent) opted for the SSB and the
remaining 3,597 (8.4 percent) elected the VSI. The number of
expected participants is smaller for 1993, with 12,095 (88
percent) having applied for the SSB and 1,654 (12 percent)
signing up for the VSI. From 1992 results, it is clear that
the SSB is the more attractive of the two programs. Service
members opting to take the VSI were most likely to be serving
in pay grades E-5 to E-7 upon separation. Of the SSB
participants, the largest percentages were in pay grades E-4
to E-5.
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Appendix A shows the actual participation rates for
1992 SSB and VSI takers by DoD occupation codes, race, sex,
and AFQT category. Appendix B shows the number of individuals
who have signed up for VSI or SSB in 1993. These members may
still be on active duty, but must leave the military by the
end of the fiscal year.
During both years, the majority of takers came from
the following occupational areas: Functional Support and
Administration; Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair;
Infantry, Guncrews and Seamanship Specialties; and Electronic
Equipment Repair. In both years, the proportion of highly-
skilled individuals provided with exit bonuses was less than
the proportion of highly-skilled individuals in the force
during 1991 or 1992.
Blacks accounted for 32.4 percent and 17.1 percent of
the SSB and VSI participants, respectively, during 1992. This
equates to an overall participation rate of 31.1 percent.
During 1993, blacks are expected to constitute 23.2 percent of
all participants. During both 1992 and 1993, the four DoD
occupational areas with the largest number of black
separations were Functional Support and Administration,
Infantry, Guncrews and Seamanship Specialties,
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair, and Service and
Supply.
In 1992 and 1993, personnel who had an AFQT score in
Category IV accounted for about 6.9 percent of the active-duty
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enlisted force. During these years, a large proportion of the
people separated under the VSI/SSB programs originally entered
the military with an AFQT score in Category I'. For example,
in 1992, 9,396 individuals were so classified, which amounted
to 22 percent. In 1993 the number decreased tc 1,276 people,
representing 9.3 percent of the total. Of the black enlisted
members taking advantage of the VSI or SSB program, 39 3
percent were classified as being in AFQT Categury IV in 1992
and 18.6 percent in 1993.
In summary, black voluntary separations were much
higher than that group's proportion of the force as a whole in
1992. Of those members having volunteered to take the VS! or
SSB during fiscal 1993, the proportion will decrease from the
1992 level; however, once again, blacks will be
disproportionately represented based on their percentage in
the total force.
Based on the distribution of VSI and SSB takers by
AFQT score, it appears that the voluntarl separation programs
tend to "favor" service members who were classified as being
in Category IV when they first enlisted. A large number of
blacks were in these ranks. With the reduction of Category IV
individuals in the force, black quality will be expected to
increase in future years. This may lead to reduced
opportunities for the 16 percent or so of the black enlisted
force whose AFQT score is below the 31st percentile.
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5. Recruitment
Yearly enlistments (or accessions) are based on
planned manpower needs, taking into account current strength
levels adjusted for projected separations and reenlistments.
Prior to legislation authorizing the VSI and SSB programs,
reducing accessions was the primary means available to the
services in their effort to prevent disruptions to readiness
and alleviate possible hardships for mid-career personnel.
Accessions have decreased significantly from pre-
drawdown levels. As shown in Table 7, non-prior service (NPS)
accessions have decreased from over 400,000 in the early 1970s
to a level slightly over 200,000 in 1992. Since 1980, blacks
have constituted approximately 19 percent of each year's NPS
accessions. In 1989, the last year before the drawdown
officially commenced, blacks represented 21.4 percent of all
new recruits. Throughout the 1980s, the number of black
recruits remained fairly constant; and it then declined
markedly after 1989. In 1992, black representation within the
accession cohort was 16.4 percent. This is the lowest level
observed since the inception of the AVF. This decrease
amounts to a 24-percent reduction in black accessions over the
three-year period.
Figure 5 shows that the proportion of "other"
minorities within the total enlisted force has been increasing
at a higher rate than that of blacks since 1982. Since 1989,
the proportion of blacks within each year's class of new
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Figure 5. Percentage Distribution of New Recruits by
Racial/Ethnic Group and Year of Entry, Fiscal
1973-92
During the six-year period from 1986 to 1992, the
number of new recruits has declined by 37.7 percent. Tables
8 and 9 show the annual percentage change for white and black
accessions since 1986. During this period, the overall effect
on white and black accessions was a decline of 38 percent and
46.6 percent, respectively. The force reduction encountered
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TABLE 7. NUMBER OF NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES COMBINED) AND
PERCENTAGE WHO ARE BLACK BY FISCAL YEAR, 1973 - 1992





















Sorc: a from Department of Defnse, poulation Renremantatin in- the Hilitarv
is, (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and
Persorml), 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991); Defense Manpower Data Center; Department of Defense,
Report "America's Volunteers: A Report on the AV," 1978, and service 1391 reports.
Note: "New R.cruits" (or non-prior service accessions) are persons who entered military
service (as an enlistee) for the first time.
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TABLE 8. NUMBER OF WHITE NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES
COMBINED) AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY FISCAL YEAR,
1986-92









Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Exatination and Accession File maintained
by Defens Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CA.
by the white segment was also of a more gr'. iual nature than
for blacks, with the largest reductions occurring in 1988 and
1990. Blacks, on the other hand, faced a more pronounced
change, with the largest cuts coming in 1990 and 1991.
These findings suggest that blacks, in general, have
faced a larger reduction in enlistment opportunities than have
other segments of the population. In proportional terms,
black accessions have been reduced from AVF historical levels
since fiscal 1989; however, the shares of other minorities and
whites have actually increased.
Although the previous discussions centered around
various tools and programs used to carry out the force
downsizing, they all serve a common purpose, which is to shape
the total force. In an effort to link the above findings,
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TABLE 9. NUMBER OF BLACK NEW RECRUITS (ALL SERVICES
COMBINED) AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE BY FISCAL
YEAR, 1986-92









Source: Military Entrance Processing Station Examination and Accesmion File, main-
tained by Defense Manpower Data Center, 1unteray, CA.
changes realized within the total force as a result of
drawdown policies are analyzed in the next chapter.
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IV. TOTAL FORCE CHANGES
A. INTRODUCTION
By the close of fiscal 1992, the total enlisted force end-
strength was 1,519,782. In comparison with the fiscal 1990
end-strength (1,732,414), this amounts to an enlisted force
reduction of 12.3 percent [Ref. 63]. The following
analytical concept is used to evaluate the overall impact of
this reduction-in-force on the demographic composition of the
military.
B. ANALYTICAL CONCEPT
Because of their reliability, force end-strength data
available at the beginning of a fiscal year serve as a
reference point. At the start of a fiscal year, force
demographics--such as racial composition, gender
characteristics, and occupational mix--are tabulated and
recorded by various offices within DoD. By utilizing these
reference points as periods of observation, changes within
demographic areas of interest may be calculated over a
specified time period (usually one year). Over the span of
one year, the total enlisted force will change as a result of
force reduction initiatives, reenlistments, accessions, and
separations. Changes observed over the time period can be
considered as "growth" within the system (with positive
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numbers indicating increases, and negative numbers decreases).
This change in the total system size can then be evaluated in
relation to the change realized within a specific demographic
group over the same time period. If the specific demographic
group declines faster than the total force, then that group's
proportion of the total enlisted force must decline.
Table 10 shows enlisted end-strength and racial represen-
tation for the years 1990 to 1992. During the two-year period
TABLE 10. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ACTIVE-DUTY ENLISTED
PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP AND FORCE END-
STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR, 1990-92
Racial/ Change
Ethnic Group 1990 1991 1992 1990-1992
White 67.4 67.4 67.4 0.0
Black 23.1 22.9 22.8 -0.8
Other 9.5 9.8 10.3 +0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Znd-strent
(mmber• n 000) 1,732 1,681 1,520 -212
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993
analyzed, white representation remained constant at 67.4
percent of force end-strength. The proportion of "other"
minorities in the total enlisted force increased by 0.8
percentage points. At the same time, the black proportion of
the total enlisted force declined by 0.8 percentage points.
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During 1991, total enlisted force end-strength declined by 3
percent from the 1990 level. Whites declined at the same rate
as their percent of the total end-strength, and therefore
accounted for the same proportion of the total enlisted force.
Blacks declined by a slightly higher rate, 4.1 percent. As a
result, their representation in the total enlisted force
declined by 0.2 percentage points. In contrast, "other"
minorities showed a growth rate of 0.12 percent during the
year and realized a slight increase of approximately 0.3
percentage points in their proportion of the force.
During 1992, total enlisted force end-strength declined by
9.6 percent from the 1991 level. Once again, the white
segment declined at approximately the same level as the total
enlisted force and their proportion remained about the same
over the one-year period. Blacks, on the other hand, experi-
enced a 16.2 percent decline in end-strength and their
proportion of the entire force dropped to 22.3 percent. This
is a total decline in the black proportion of the total
enlisted force over the two-year period of 0.6 percentage
points. The decline realized by "other" minorities, was
apprnximately 4.9 percent, less than that of the force as a
whole; and their proportion of the force therefore increased
to 10.3 percent.
An effort was made to determine if representation
differences exist between service men and women. Tables 11
and 12 show representation and end-strength by gender and
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race. As seen here, from 1990 to 1992, blacks were the only
racial group among male enlisted members that had a decline in
overall representation. Black men, as a proportion of all
enlisted men in the military, dropped by 0.9 percentage
points. This occurred because black men experienced a higher
TABLE 11. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MALE ACTIVE-DUTY
ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP WITH
MALE END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR,
1990-1992
Racial/Ethnic Change
Group 1990 1991 1992 1990
- 1992
White 68.6 68.6 68.7 +0.1
Black 21.8 21.5 20.9 -0.9
Other 9.6 9.9 10.4 +0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
Male enlisted end-
strength, (nmbers in 000) 1,544 1,498 1,348 
-196
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993
rate of decline during the period than did enlisted men as a
whole. Although both black and white women were somewhat less
represented in the enlisted force, the decline for black women
was somewhat greater than that of their white counterparts.
As shown in Table 12, the proportion of black women among all
enlisted women declined by 0.5 percentage points.
It is interesting to observe that the representation of
"other" minorities-- both male and female--increased by
approximately 1 percentage point during the period. The
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TABLE 12. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE ACTIVE-DUTY
ENLISTED PERSONNEL BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP
WITH FEMALE END-STRENGTH REDUCTIONS BY
FISCAL YEAR, 1990-1992
Racial/Ethnic Change
Group 1990 1991 1992 1990 - 1992
White 57.5 57.2 57.1 -0.4
Black 34.2 34.2 33.7 -0.5
Other 8.3 8.6 9.2 +1.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
blisted Fale End-Strength
(mnimber in 000m) 189 182 172 -196
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Force Management and Personnel), report of 16 Feb 1993
percentage change in the active-duty enlisted force and gender
categories during the 1990-1992 period are summarized below in
Table 13. As seen here, the rate of decline for women was
slightly higher than the overall rate from 1990 to 1991. On
the other hand, during the 1991 to 1992 period, the rate for
women declined by just 5.5 percent, compared with a rate of
9.6 percent for the force as a whole.
From 1990 to 1991, the number of black men in the military
declined by 4.2 percent. In comparison, the number of white
men fell by 2.9 percent during the same period. (This was
equivalent to the decline for all men in the force.) "Other"
minority men eyperienced a slight decrease of 0.2 perce-at
During this same one-year period, the number of black women
fell by 3.7 percent. This approximates the reduction for
women as a whole in the force. At the same time, the number
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of white women declined by 4.0 percent; and "other" minority
women realized an increase of 0.6 percent.
TABLE 13. PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN END-STRENGTH FOR THE
TOTAL FORCE, BY GENDER AND FISCAL YEAR PERIODS,
1990-1992
Period Total Force Male Female
1990 - 1991 -3.0 -2.9 -3.5
1991 - 1992 -9.6 -10.1 -5.5
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force
Management and Personnel) report of 16 Feb 1993
When segmented by race, it is seen that black men realized
a decline of 12.6 percent over the one-year period ending in
1992. The representation of white men within the force
declined by 10.0 percent. This is approximately equal to the
percentage reduction in the total male end-strength. "Other"
minority men declined by 5.4 percent. This is why the "other"
minority share of the total end-strength actually increased
during the period, as shown in Table 11.
In the one-year period ending in 1992, both black and
white women experienced a relative decline in their respective
totals. Black women declined by 7.0 percent. White women
declined by 5.7 percent. "Other" minority women continued to
experience growth; and, as a result, this group's share of
total female end-strength increased by 1.3 percentage points,
as shown in Table 12.
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These calculations serve to demonstrate that, while the
minority proportion of the enlisted force has remained fairly
constant, the black proportion of the total force is
declining. The evidence obtained from this two-year period
suggests that the drawdown has, so far, disproportionately
affected blacks compared with other racial groups in the
enlisted population.
If these trends continue, at the completion of the
drawdown, black representation in the military could be
considerably lower than it was in 1989, when blacks
constituted 23 percent of the total enlisted force. In the
next section, some speculation is offered concerning the
future of blacks in the military.
C. BLACK REPRESENTATION AFTER THE DRAWDOWN
The military is a major provider of jobs, training, and
socioeconomic mobility for black members of society. Due to
the lack of employment opportunities in the civilian labor
market, it has been suggested that the military may serve as
"an employer of last resort" for many black youths. As of
December 1992, the unemployment rate for black male youths,
aged 16 to 19, was 42.2 percent. White men of the same age
faced an unemployment rate of 17.2 percent. Over the same
timeframe, the unemployment rate for black women, aged 16 to
19, was 36.5 percent, while that of white women was 15.1
percent [Ref. 64]. With little opportunity for
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civilian employment, black youths will most likely continue to
view the military as an attractive employment alternative.
Although the proportion of blacks in the U.S. population
continues to grow, other minorities enjo, the highest annual
growth rate of any segment of the population. Since 1970, the
"other races" segment of the national population has been
growing at four-times the rate of blacks, and eight-times
faster than that of whites [Ref. 65].
The major selection criteria used to accept or reject
individuals for military service are educational attainment
and AFQT scores. Although black education levels and AFQT
scores are rising, they are not increasing at a pace that will
allow blacks to gain much ground on "other" minorities during
enlistment screening. Based on current quality standards in
use, the lower AFQT scores attained by blacks, on average,
could lead to further erosion of the share they currently
enjoy within the enlisted ranks.
In 1988, 57 percent of the black population lived in
central cities or metropolitan areas. This was more than
double that of the white segment, which was 27 percent
[Ref. 66]. In 1991, the military services reported that
recruiting resources were being targeted toward areas where a
higher percentage of military-age youth resided. Such areas
include the Southwest, West, and South. The areas of
expansion were found to have greater proportions of other
minorities (mainly persons of hispanic origin) than blacks.
60
At the same time, markets with high applicant rejection rates
were targeted for closure. This change of policy led to the
closure of recruiting offices in many urban areas, where
blacks tend to be concentrated. The reduction of recruiters
in inner-city areas probably had an important impact on the
drop in black recruits during the early 1990s.
The number and proportion of recruits who score in AFQT
Category IV have been on the decline. In fact, the proportion
of Category IV recruits has fallen from 22.3 percent in 1980
to 6.4 percent in 1989. Less than one percent of the 1992
cohort was classified as being in Category IV. At the same
time, it should be noted that the AFQT mean score for blacks,
aged 18 to 23 in the general population, falls within Category
IV. In comparison, the AFQT mean score for white women, like
that of their male counterparts, is above the 50th percentile.
The services are in the process of removing barriers that
restrict women from serving in combat-related occupations. If
such barriers are removed, and women are attracted to military
service at a greater rate than presently realized, it is
possible that black men attaining a score in AFQT Category IV
will all but disappear and those in AFQT Category IIIB will
become the new "marginally qualified" recruit [Ref. 67).
This conclusion was drawn in a recent study of the
military's "newly unqualified" population for the Department
of Education. Just looking at the force downsizing--without
considering the possible effects of admitting more highly-
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qualified women--it was predicted that black youths may be
denied enlistment at a rate three times greater than that of
other youths within the general population. Further, the
study predicted that AFQT Category IV individuals could be
denied enlistment altogether, and AFQT Category IIIB
individuals could make up 72 percent of the newly unqualified.
[Ref. 68)
Table 14 provides some insight as to the quality and
accession levels desired by the services in future years.
Based on the small growth in accessions and the high quality
standards desired, barring any major policy changes, it seems
highly probable that the black share within the active-duty
military will continue to decline.
Applicants are defined as those individuals who arrive at
a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) or Mobile
Examining Team (MET) site for ASVAB testing. In recent years,
fewer individuals have been taking the AFQT. As one analyst
observes, recruiters often conduct prescreening on condensed
versions of the AFQT within their offices. This prescreening
procedure operates to discourage many lower-aptitude or
marginally-qualified people from applying for enlistment and
taking the foirmal examination. [Ref. 69)
The Army and Navy have reported a drop in quality among
new recruits during the first six months of fiscal 1993. For
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TABLE 14. PROJECTIONS FOR THE QUALITY AND QUANTITY OF NEW
RECRUITS, FISCAL 1993-99
DoDTotals 11993 1994 1995 11996 11997 1998 1999
Numbers in 000a
XPe 216.8 182.0 193.2 201.9 221.2 214.0 214.1
PS 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Total 218.8 184.0 195.2 205.9 225.2 218.0 218.1
Percent of total accessions
NHS&D1 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.9
NP8 M4DG 96.1 96.1 96.0 96.3 96.0 96.1 96.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percent of total accessions
(I-lIIA) 64.1 65.8 66.2 66.2 64.9 65.3 65.1
MPS HBDG
(IIIB) 31.0 29.5 28.9 29.1 30.0 29.9 30.1
MPS RHDG
(IV) .9 .8 .9 .9 1.0 .9 .9
Total 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 96.1 100.0
Abbreviations: MlDG=higt school diploma holder; NHSDG=non-high school diploma holder,
including persons with alternative of equivalency diplomas); NFpsnon-prior service,
PSMpersons with prior service, I-IIZA=Armed Forces Qualification Test (A1QT) Category
I-IIIA; IIIB=AFQT Category IIIB; IV:APQT Category IV. Totals may not add due to
rounding. Figures shown are PON (Program Objective Memoranda) submissions from FY
1993-1999. 1994-99 forecast of total NMP HMDG accessions ahulatod from individual
Service's PON.
Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Managementmand Personrml)
Active Force Enlisted Accession Analysis Fy 1980-99 Report dated 5 Nov 1992.
all services combined, approximately 94 percent of all new
recruits possessed a high school diploma, compared with 99
percent during the first six months of the previous year.
The proportion of "high quality" recruits (those who possess
a high school diploma and have an AFQT score in Categories I -
IIIA) also declined slightly--falling from 62 percent during
the first six months of 1992 to about 60 percent a year later.
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The number of black recruits increased by 24,000; however, the
proportion of blacks remained consistent with the 1992 (first
six months) level at 14 percent. [Ref. 70]
Dwindling resources for recruiting and lessened interest
in service among youth have been cited as possible reasons for
the decline. Based on the 1992 Youth Attitude Tracking
Survey, approximately 27 percent of men aged 16 to 21 would
"definitely" or "probably" enlist in one of the armed
services. This was down slightly from 29 percent in 1991. In
1989, 53 percent of black men between the ages of 16 and 22
said they were likely to enlist in the military. In 1990,
that number had decreased to 44 percent; and by 1992, it was
down to 37 percent. The propensity of women (16 to 22 years
old) to enlist has remained virtually unchanged since 1990 at
11 percent. [Ref. 71]
The services have voiced concern that reduced recruiting
budgets have not allowed them to get out the message they are
still "hiring." The military's advertising budgets have been
slashed considerably in recent years. For example. the Army's
1993 budget for print, radio, television, and billboards is
$22.5 million. This figure is 38 percent below the amount
budgeted during the previous year. In 1990, the Army had an
advertising budget of $65 million, almost triple the amount in
1993. [Ref. 72]
Potential problems looming on the horizon for military
manpower planners include proposed national service programs
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and pay freezes. Although the details of various national
service proposals vary, some observers are worried that the
monetary benefits offered for two years of community service
may compete with the military's current enlistment incentives,
such as the Montgomery G.I. Bill [Ref. 73]. Not only
will national service vie for the same labor pool, it may
prove attractive to persons desiring college or further
training (i.e., the higher-quality individual). At the same
time, Al From, president of the Democratic Leadership Council
(DLC), has suggested that a DLC-backed program of national
service be viewed as an "upward-mobility track" for
disadvantaged youth when the military is downsized
[Ref. 74]. A program designed to steer youngsters into
jobs or college could be especially important with the
shrinkage of the military.
The Clinton Administration has proposed to give no pay
raise to federal workers (including members of the military)
in 1994 and to limit raises between 1995 and 1997 to 1.5
percentage points less than the rise in the Employer Cost
Index. Based on forecasts by the Wharton Econometrics
Forecasting Association, the potential exists for the pay
disparity between military and civilian wages to increase from
a ?resent level of 11.7 percent to about 19.9 percent by 1997
[Ref. 75]. With this loss of sarnings potential, the
military may find added difficulty in attaining the desired
numbers and quality of new recruits in future years.
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In conclusion, if present trends follow course, it is
likely that black representation within the All-Volunteer
Force will continue to decline from pre-drawdown levels.
However, coupled with the uncertainties presented by the
military reorganization and future difficulties in recruiting,
it is also possible that the decline in black representation
may not be as severe as presently indicated.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This study presents information on the post-Cold War
military drawdown and its effects on blacks within the
enlisted force. It is found that black representation
declined within the military's enlisted ranks from 1990
through 1992. Since the introduction of the all-volunteer
military in 1973, blacks have enlisted in the military at a
rate that has exceeded their proportion in the national
population. Economic factors have been identified as a major
influence in the attraction of black youths to military
service.
With the Cold War at an end, the United States has
determined that its military forces can be substantially
reduced. Black youths were a major source of military
manpower during the Cold War build-up of the force, and they
are likely to experience a decline in their level of
representation as the military shrinks. Major causes of the
decline in black representation are higher entry standards,
changes in recruiting practices, and the introduction of
various force-reduction policies that may be particularly
unfavorable to blacks as a whole.
The primary selection criteria used to accept or reject
individuals for military service are educational attainment
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(high school graduation) and AFQT scores. Of all racial
groups in the U.S., blacks generally receive the lowest scores
on the AFQT. Although black education levels and achievement
test scores are rising nationally, they are not increasing at
a pace that will establish parity with other racial groups in
the near future.
Since 1975, a higher percentage of black youths entering
military service for the first time have possessed a high
school diploma as compared to their white counterparts. At
the same time, a relatively large proportion of these black
high school graduates have attained scores that place them in
AFQT Category IV.
The number and proportion of military recruits who score
in AFQT Category IV are on the decline. In addition to
"quality floors" established by Congress, the services seek to
limit their intake of AFQT Category IV personnel whenever
possible. In 1981, individuals scoring in Category IV made up
21 percent of all new recruits. By 1992, the proportion of
AFQT Category IV recruits had declined to less than 1 percent.
Black "high-quality" accessions (high school graduates
with an AFQT test score in Categories I-IIIA) have increased
since 1980. However, the percentage of black high-quality
accessions still remains considerably below that of whites and
new recruits as a whole. Since 1989, the proportion of black
high quality accessions has increased by 16 percentage points.
This increase in quality was borne mostly at the expense of
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blacks in Category IV, whose recruitment declined by 13.5
percentage points over the same period.
The primary method of force reduction during the defense
drawdown has been through the control of accessions and, to a
lesser extent, the use of voluntary separation programs (the
VSI and SSB). Since 1989, the proportion of blacks within
each year's class of new recruits has declined, while that of
whites has remained fairly stable, and that of "other" minori-
ties has increased. In 1989, the last year before the
drawdown officially commenced, blacks represented 21.4 percent
of all new recruits. By 1992, the black percentage was down
to 16.4 percent, the lowest level observed since the end of
the draft. In 1991, the services reported that recruiting
stations in areas of low return, namely urban areas, were
being closed. With blacks living predominantly in these
areas, the likelihood increases that many will lose contact
with military recruiters. Also, recruiting resources were
moved to new territories--the Southwest, West, and South--due
to a shift in youth population demographics. These new areas
are proportionately less populated by blacks, which may also
contribute to a continuing decline in black representation
among new recruits.
The services have used voluntary separation programs based
on monetary incentives to encourage excess personnel to leave
the military prior to their eligibility for retirement. In
1992, blacks accounted for 31 percent of all enlisted SSB and
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VSI participants, a level much higher than that group's
proportion of the enlisted force, which was 22.3 percent.
During 1993, blacks are expected to constitute 23.2 percent of
total voluntary separation participants.
In 1992 and 1993, personnel who had AFQT scores in
Category IV (when they originally entered the military)
accounted for approximately 6.9 percent of the active-duty
enlisted force. Approximately 16 percent of these personnel
were black. Of the black enlisted members taking advantage of
the VSI or SSB program, 39.3 percent were classified as being
in AFQT Category IV in 1992 and 18.6 percent in 1993.
The minority proportion of the enlisted force has remained
fairly stable during the early years of the downsizing;
however, the black proportion of the total force has been
declining. Officials within DoD have stated on various
occasions that the racial proportions of the total force are
not expected to change as a result of drawdown policies.
Based on the findings in this study, clearly, the drawdown has
disproportionately affected blacks compared with other racial
groups in the enlisted population.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The military serves as a major provider of jobs and
training opportunities for America's youth. Facing high
unemployment rates and socioeconomic disadvantage in the
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larger society, black teenagers have turned to the military in
large numbers for the many benefits it offers.
Not everyone will be affected equally by the defense
drawdown. Some members of the society may suffer or profit to
a greater extent than others. Because entry into the military
is tied largely to educational achievement, groups in society
that have the least educational opportunities--whether
segmented by race, socioeconomic status, or geographic region-
-are most likely to become the military's "newly unqualified."
It is not completely clear how the drawdown will affect
black youth. Although military-aged blacks continue to be
represented in the armed forces above the level of their
proportion in the general population, many who may have once
received training and employment opportunities in the military
will likely find that those opportunities are no longer
available. Those who, under previous circumstances, would
have been allowed entry into military service, may therefore
face the prospect of reduced socioeconomic opportunities.
Military manpower planners should be aware that black
representation within the enlisted force will probably decline
as long as entry standards remain at their present level or
increase. This poses a potential problem for young blacks and
for the nation as a whole, because the military has long-
served as an important, positive influence on the lives of
many black young men and women.
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Further studies of personnel quality measures and
enlistment standards may prove beneficial. Such studies could
aid the military in assessing its qualitative needs as well as
improve the cost-efectiveness of recruiting and force
management.
The military's standards for screening applicants have not
hampered the participation of blacks in the AVF of the past 20
years; but, as the force has contracted, enlistment criteria
have risen, and many otherwise-qualified blacks have been
turned away. The AFQT has been found to be an effective
predictor of personnel performance. During the defense
downsizing, it may also be an impediment to black enlistments;
and in the absence of alternative selection criteria, the
participation of blacks in the military could continue to fall
with each passing year.
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